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BOOK REVIEWS
Brettschneider, Corey. When the State Speaks, What Should It Say? How Democracies
Can Protect Expression and Promote Equality.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. Pp. 216. $35.00 ðclothÞ.
This book seeks to find a third way between what are typically positioned as two
opposed views on the contested issue of freedom of speech versus hate speech.
The first is the view that freedom of speech mandates the protection of indi-
viduals’ right to express their views without distinction as to content and that,
therefore, in a democracy we must tolerate even those views that themselves
are so harmful to equality as potentially to undermine the democratic fabric.
Even the worst excesses of hateful speech must be left unregulated. Corey Brett-
schneider calls this the ‘Hateful Society’ dystopia. He contrasts this to the ‘Inva-
sive State’ dystopia, in which the tangible and manifest harms of hate speech are
acknowledged and then sought to be addressed through hate speech laws that,
typically, punish the hate speakers for their views through criminal law. Brett-
schneider posits that these two dystopias are often described as the neutralists
versus the prohibitionists, or alternatively as the United States ðin which First
Amendment jurisprudence has typically rendered hate speech laws invalid on
constitutional groundsÞ versus European liberal democracies ðwhich typically
prohibit egregious hate speech through criminal lawÞ.
The third, and alternate, way forward that Brettschneider favors is one he
calls ‘democratic persuasion’, in which both the goal of noninterference with
hate speech and the goal of preserving key elements of democratic governance
are met. This is achieved by on the one hand preserving the free speech rights of
hate speakers, by not regulating their views via criminal law, and on the other
hand responding to the views of hate speakers by using the state’s considerable
expressive power to criticize, condemn, and defund hate speakers and their or-
ganizations. The power of democratic persuasion is to be used strictly noncoer-
cively, in order to preserve the rights of hate speakers, who are as entitled to treat-
ment as free and equal citizens as are their targets and the polity as a whole.
Indeed, the entire framework of democratic persuasion rests on the idea of
free and equal citizenship. With this as the state’s goal, it is prevented from co-
ercively interfering in hate speakers’ right to speak since they ð just as nonhate
speakers doÞ possess freedom of speech, freedom of association, and freedom
of conscience. But when the state decides how it might validly respond to speech
that is so hateful that it undermines free and equal citizenship, it must do so in
a manner that is itself consistent with the maintenance of free and equal citi-
zenship and that simultaneously seeks to promote the values of free and equal
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citizenship, by explaining and articulating the reasons why rights should be re-
spected. This reasoning would seek to convince citizens of the rightness of free
and equal citizenship. “These democratic values should be adopted by citizens
and promoted by the state, because they ground the legitimacy of the govern-
ment and justify protecting rights” ð4Þ. The regime thus produced is termed a
‘value democracy’, a nonneutral theory of democracy that integrates the neu-
tral treatment of hate speech with nonneutral behavior of the state in relation
to that speech.
One of the original components of Brettschneider’s argument, resting as it
does in a context of First Amendment jurisprudence, is the idea that the state
can be overtly nonneutral in deciding whom to criticize, which organizations to
condemn, and to which organizations it ought to grant subsidies and tax privi-
leges ðchaps. 4 and 5Þ. In an argument that explicitly seeks to contradict elements
of current First Amendment doctrines on what the state may say when it acts as
the speaker ðwhen it may say what it wishes toÞ and what the state may say when
it funds private organizations to speak ðwhen it must maintain a content-neutral
perspectiveÞ, Brettschneider argues that the overriding consideration for the state
in deciding what to say when it ‘speaks’ is whether its acts instantiate the goal
of free and equal citizenship. The state is therefore justified in granting funds
and tax privileges to organizations that support the goals of free and equal citi-
zenship and equally justified in denying funds and tax privileges to organizations
ðlike the Westboro Baptist ChurchÞ whose doctrine and policies seek to deny free
and equal citizenship. Although grants, subsidies, and tax status may be denied
such organizations, their freedom-of-speech rights are not therefore interfered
with since they may still holdmeetings, seek to recruit members, and present their
views to the public. This also prevents the state from being seen to be complicit
in the ideas and values of those who oppose free and equal citizenship, which
pure noninterference might suggest ð43Þ.
The state’s role as a democratic persuader is posited as necessary in part be-
cause Brettschneider argues that the first process that should be undertaken to
realize free and equal citizenship in the context of hate speech is that individuals
whose own views are hostile to free and equal citizenship should engage in ‘reflec-
tive revision’ of their own views, measured against that benchmark ðchap. 2Þ. This
admonition is required in relation to all views of ‘public relevance’, including
those that may occur in a sphere traditionally thought of as ‘private’, such as the
family or a nonprofit organization. Brettschneider seeks to replace the spatial
metaphor that has sought to distinguish public from private in terms largely re-
lated to place with instead a conception of the activities that are publicly rele-
vant. Therefore, in any space or place, “beliefs and practices that conflict with the
ideal of free and equal citizenship can be of public concern, and should be
changed tomake them compatible with democratic values” ð24Þ. He describes this
conception of public relevance as a “thin” one ð37Þ, one that does not submit
all of private life to public scrutiny but only those elements relevant to free and
equal citizenship.
The idea of reflective revision, whereby citizens would reflect on the ways in
which their own values cohere, or do not cohere, with achieving free and equal
citizenship, is highly utopian. Brettschneider’s attempt to outline an extralegal
response to discrimination and marginalization is to be commended in this area
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of scholarship since it does seek to reach beyond the binary divide that is often
presented in the literature between neutralists and prohibitionists. There have
been other important contributions to this genre of scholarship ðe.g., Eric Heinze
andGavin Phillipson, Debating Hate Speech ½Oxford: Hart, 2013; KatharineGelber,
“‘Speaking Back’: The Likely Fate of Hate Speech Policy in the United States and
Australia,” in Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech, ed. Ishani Maitra and
Mary Kathryn McGowan ½Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Owen Fiss, The
Irony of Free Speech ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996Þ that unfortu-
nately are not examined in this volume, but nevertheless a consideration of ex-
tralegal responses is important and often overlooked. To that extent, this part of
the argument makes an important contribution.
However, while Brettschneider argues carefully and convincingly why reflec-
tive revision is important and ought to be undertaken, he does not enter into a
consideration of how this might be achieved. He suggests that citizens are obli-
gated to do so ðhe also says it is “incumbent” upon them; 54Þ. This is clearly a
moral obligation, not a legal one, since coercion is not permitted to force citi-
zens to undertake reflective revision; rather, citizens must engage in it voluntar-
ily. He calls on citizens to criticize their own and others’ discriminatory behavior
and “seek to transform the beliefs behind it” ð42Þ. The purpose of reflective re-
vision is for citizens to reevaluate their own beliefs ð58Þ, to render them consistent
with public actions that seek to achieve the ideal of free and equal citizenship ð37Þ.
Brettschneider notes that their beliefs may not change, but as long as their public
actions are guided by the principles of free and equal citizenship, this is enough
to have achieved reflective revision. Full voluntary examination of all one’s con-
cepts and public values is to be desired, but it is not required ð60Þ. This undertak-
ing is justified in order to preserve democratic congruence and legitimacy of the
state, empirical stability, interconnection, and public trust in the fact that state-
mandated policies will be adhered to at the coal-face of political interactions.
Brettschneider argues that it is essential that the choice of whether to enter into
reflective revision—or if one does make the choice, to change one’s values—must
be entirely noncoercive. Where reflective revision fails, as he acknowledges it
may, the state’s role as democratic persuader is brought to bear. While acknowl-
edging then that reflective revision cannot be achieved by citizens on their own,
and that this process is buttressed by the state’s role as speaker, there is little en-
gagement with the question of how this reflective revision is to be achieved, other
than to stress the role of reasoning and persuasion. Had Brettschneider engaged
with the question of how this might be achieved more deeply ðe.g., by engaging
with the literature on speech-act theoryÞ, this component of his argument may
have been rendered more convincing. As it stands, he instead emphasizes the vol-
untary nature of this process, stressing that citizens can opt out ð63Þ since to do
otherwise would fail to respect them as free and equal.
There are other bases on which to commend this book. First, it has a help-
ful clarity on the nature of hate speech itself, defining ‘hateful viewpoints’ not
as bound up with emotion but instead by the fact that they express “an idea or
ideology that opposes free and equal citizenship” and is not a direct threat ð75Þ.
This is useful in a field in which the term ‘hate speech’ has led to some misun-
derstanding over its nature and a primary association with a psychological ‘hatred’
rather than discrimination or marginalization. Jeremy Waldron has also recently
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made the point ðThe Harm in Hate Speech ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2012Þ that the term ‘hate speech’ implies that what is important is how
targets feel about what is said to them, when what is actually at stake is a harm to
human dignity. Where the marginalization or harm to human dignity element
of the hate speech act is elided with psychological dislike, it makes it difficult to
prevent the extension of hate speech laws to all kinds of dislikes and disagree-
ments—which can seriously undermine the concept itself and, by extension, the
validity and legitimacy of hate speech laws in those jurisdictions that have them.
Second, this book differentiates between viewpoint neutrality, which is ap-
plied to the extension of freedom-of-speech rights to all citizens on the ground
that they must be treated as free and equal citizens, and neutralism, which Brett-
schneider rejects in favor of a nonneutral state approach to its own persuasive
ðincluding funding-basedÞ powers. There is a particular clarity in using this dis-
tinction, which is useful to the literature.
A weakness of the book, however, lies in its contextual and conceptual resi-
dence inside a particularly US-informed view of equality. Brettschneider argues
throughout the book for a particular conception of equality, eruditely tackling
some hard cases and previous Supreme Court decisions from the perspective of
his democratic persuasion, arguing where and when it would be justified for the
state not to intervene so as to protect individuals and respect them as free and
equal citizens or to intervene so as to preserve those same values. Yet other juris-
dictions view equality quite differently. To take just one example, Canada has both
criminal hate speech laws at a federal level and civil hate speech laws at provin-
cial level. In the famous R v. Keegstra hate speech case, which considered the fate
of a high school teacher who communicated anti-Semitic statements to his stu-
dents, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the hate speech prohibition
in the Canadian criminal code ðs319½3½aÞ, while it did infringe on the freedom
of expression outlined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ðs11½dÞ,
was a reasonable limit on that right as permitted in the Charter ðs1Þ. In consider-
ing its reasonableness, the court noted that s1 of the Charter “operates to accen-
tuate a uniquely Canadian vision of a free and democratic society” ðKeegstra, 51Þ.
The court agreed that the legislation in question was designed to “ensure the
equality of all individuals in Canadian society” and that the “harms caused by
this message run directly counter to the values central to a free and democratic
society.” The court argued that in restricting hate speech in criminal law, “Parlia-
ment is . . . seeking to bolster the notion of mutual respect necessary in a nation
which venerates the equality of all persons” ð63Þ. It argued further that preser-
vation of a multicultural society could not be achieved by giving “free rein” to
the promotion of hatred, which threatens the value of equality ð65Þ. The ap-
proach of the Canadian Supreme Court raises serious doubts as to the portabil-
ity of Brettschneider’s argument to jurisdictions not immersed in a particularly
US-informed view of how to instantiate and achieve equality.
This is an interesting and well-argued book, although it suffers from an ex-
cess of repetition, particularly in the early chapters. It also presents an oversim-
plified view of the ‘Hateful Society’ and the ‘Invasive State’, which does not, for
example, consider those jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia that have
implemented civil law responses to hate speech, with a view to avoiding the worst
excesses of the invasive state that Brettschneider criticizes. The book expands on
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Brettschneider’s previous work ð“When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?”
Perspectives on Politics 8 ½2010: 1005–19Þ in important ways, including his consid-
eration of religious freedom. It is an important addition to the bookshelf of any




Finkelstein, Claire; Ohlin, Jens David; and Altman, Andrew, eds. Targeted Killings:
Law and Morality in an Asymmetric World.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xx1496. $95.00 ðclothÞ.
Pause and rewind to September 11, 2001. Imagine that a group of radical jihad-
ists have successfully executed a highly coordinated, multitarget terrorist attack
onUS soil, themost deadly inmodernAmerican history. Imagine that the terrorist
mastermind considered to be behind the attacks is yet to be apprehended, thought
to be actively planning further terrorist attacks, and managing a vast network of
terrorist cells across numerous sovereign nations in theMiddle East and South East
Asia. In order to avoid capture, he hides far from any conventional battlefield. He
does not wear the uniform that traditionally marks combatant status, nor does
he carry a weapon that could signal that he is prepared to take part in hostilities.
He is, in all likelihood, taking refuge in a cave or otherwise trying to camouflage
himself amongmen, women, and childrenwhomay not share or even know of his
cause. Advances in communications technologies allow the terrorist to continue
spreading his dangerous message to other extremists who then go on to perpe-
trate further acts of deadly terrorism. Yet the same technological advances allow
the USmilitary and intelligence bodies to improve their efforts to hunt the terror-
ist leader and others in his command chain. If the US government were to track,
target, and kill those individuals, would such action comply with international
regulations, the law of armed conflict, and contemporary principles of just-war
theory?
Let us now continue the hypothetical and fast-forward more than a decade.
You are now in the unenviable role of President of the United States of America
and have inherited two largely unpopular and costly wars from an equally un-
popular two-term president. After some internal discussion and debate, your na-
tional security team approaches you and advises that they may know the where-
abouts of a known terrorist. The tactics taken by this individual and those close
to him suggest that while he is not among its most active members, it is prob-
able that he is a high-level member of Al Qaeda, supporting communications, lo-
gistics, and the recruitment and inculcation of radical ideals on new members
and thus likely to pose amore indirect though equally significant and real threat to
the United States, its citizens, and those of its coalition partners and various other
innocent people. You are presented with four options. You can choose not to act
on the information; wait for a more concrete identification; bomb the sparsely
populated location where the suspected terrorist is thought to be hiding; or dis-
patch a small, elite force of special operations soldiers to either capture or kill the
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